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RECENT DECISIONS
the presence requirement ought to be strictly enforced. The conflict
exists between a strict interpretation which emphasizes the personal
liberty of the individual and a liberal interpretation which em-
phasizes the maintenance of public order and the dispensing of
justice. Certainly there is something to be said for both sides.
But it would appear that any hedging on the strict application
of protections from the power of the state involves great risks
to individual freedom. The fact that it has been contended that
an estimated seventy-five per cent of arrests made today are illegal 35
indicates that many law enforcement officers are either willing to
make illegal arrests, or are unaware of the requirements of a
lawful arrest. If personal liberty is to be protected, the burden
falls on the members of the judiciary who can preserve it by
strictly enforcing the presently existing statutory requirements for
a legal arrest. If this course of action makes too onerous the
task of law enforcement officers, the solution lies in a modification
of the laws governing arrest. This should be accomplished by
legislative action, not by a failure of the courts to strictly enforce
the law as presently written.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - REMOVAL By THIRD-PARTY DEFEND-
ANT TO A DISTICT COURT UNDER § 1441 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE.-
In an action between two citizens of New York, not involving a
federal question, defendant served a third-party complaint on a
citizen of California who then had the action removed to a federal
district court. The third-party defendant maintained the district
court had jurisdiction on two grounds: (1) the diversity required
by section 1441(b) of the Judicial Code 1 existed between the
movant and the third-party plaintiff, and (2) under section 1441 (c) ,2
35 HouTs, FRom ARPEST To RELEAsE 24 (1958).
128 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). "Any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properlyjoined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought."
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958). '"Whenever a separate and independent claim
or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined
with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its
original jurisdiction."
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the third-party complaint asserted a "separate and independent
claim or cause of action" which would have been removable if sued
on alone. Held: the proper construction of section 1441 "negatives
the removal power in a third-party defendant." Burlingham v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
The third-party removal question under section 1441 has re-
sulted in considerable confusion among the federal district courts, 4
particularly in the Second and Third Circuits.5 A careful analysis
of section 1441 in light of these opinions, warrants a consideration
of three distinct issues: 6 (1) is a third-party defendant a "de-
fendant" within the meaning of the section, 7 (2) is the application
of section 1441(c) limited to claims joined by the plaintiff,8 and
(3) is the third-party claim sufficiently unrelated to the main
claim to be a "separate and independent cause of action." 9 The
3 Burlingham v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
4 See Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680,
682 (W.D. Ark. 1951); 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACticE I[0.167[10], at 1053
(2d ed. 1961).
5 Unlike the principal case, in President & Directors of Manhattan Co.
v. Monogram Associates Inc., 81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1949), the court
permitted removal by a third-party defendant finding 1) diversity and
2) that the third-party controversy was separate and distinct from that stated
in the pleadings between the original plaintiff and original defendant. A
similar result was reached by a New Jersey district court in Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1954). This
decision was recently impliedly overruled by the same court in White v.
Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 722 (D.N.J. 1962), the court now
holding that third-party claims are not sufficiently unrelated to main claims
to be separate and independent actions.
6 1A MOORE, op. cit. mspra note 4, at 1049.
7 White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., supra note 5, at 719. The court reasoned
that "Sec. 1441(a) does not utilize the words 'third-party defendant,' but
merely uses the word 'defendant.' To define the word defendant to mean
not only the defendant in an original complaint but in addition a third-
party defendant, would be an unwarranted act of judicial legislation."
Ibid.; 1A MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4, fr 0.157[7], at 263-64 n.8.
8 See Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 754, 762
(W.D. Ark. 1959), wherein Judge Miller stated: "The court is not
convinced that the claims asserted by the defendants against the third party
defendant are separate and independent claims, but in view of the provisions
of Section 1441(c) . . . the court does not think that it is necessary to
determine that question for the reason that the removal statute limits removal
on the basis of a separate and independent claim to a situation where there
is a joinder of claims by the plaintiff and does not authorize removal by a
third-party defendant." See also 1A MooRE, op. cit. supra note 4, 0.167[10],
at 1053; Moore & Van Dercreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal
Problems: The Separate and Independent Clain Under Section 1441(c), 46
IOWA L. RE:v. 489, 509 (1961).
9 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951); Harper
v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hart-Bartlett-
Sturtevant Grain Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 757, 762 (W.D. Mo.
1952).
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great majority of courts do not decide removability on all three
of these bases but usually limit their consideration, assuming either
diversity or a federal question exists, to whether or not there is
a separate and independent cause of action involved in the third-
party suit. If a court determines that such an ancillary suit must
comply with all three of the above prerequisites, it is indeed apply-
ing a very strict test for removal and is, in effect, limiting the
right of removal. Congress has indicated that it favors such
limitation.
Prior to the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, a third-
party suit was removable to a federal court, assuming diversity or
a federal question existed, if there was a "separable controversy." 10
Congress, desiring to abridge the right of removal,'" passed section
1441(c) which authorized such removal whenever there is a
"separate and independent claim or cause of action." 12 In inter-
preting this new section in 1951, the Supreme Court in American
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn ' 3 stated that there is no doubt that
"separate cause of action" restricts removal more than did the
phrase "separable controversy." 14 The construction thus placed
upon section 1441 by the Supreme Court acknowledged the con-
gressional purpose of limiting the number of cases to be removed
from state courts.' 5 It is clear that such a policy of preserving
state jurisdiction has long been implemented by the federal courts.' 6
Therefore, it would be in furtherance of the congressional inteilt
to adhere to a rigid test for removal.
There has been little uniformity of construction by the district
courts of section 1441 with regard to third-party practice. As
to the first consideration, i.e., does the word "defendant" include
third-party defendant, the courts are generally silent.17 The fore-
10 Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d 227, 232-33 (5th Cir.
1945); Habermel v. Mong, 31 F.2d 822 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
587 (1929) ; see Moore & Van Dercreek, supra note 8.
11 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, supra note 9, at 10.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958).
13 Supra note 9. at 11.
14.American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, supra note 9, at 12. The Supreme
Court expounded that there may be only one cause of action and yet there
could be a number of separable controversies. Ibid.
15 1 BARRON & HOLTzoF, FEDERAL PRACTiCE & PRocEDuRE § 105, at
491 (Rules ed. 1960).16 In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288
(1938), Mr. Justice Roberts remarked that "the intent of Congress drastically
to restrict federal jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of different
states has always been rigorously enforced by the courts." See McCoy v. Siler,
205 F.2d 498, 500-01 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953); Hill v.
Branscum, 208 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
17 Dowell Div. of Dow Chem. Co. v. Ormsby, 204 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Ky.
1962). This court adopted Professor Moore's thesis that no third-party suit
affords the basis for removal.
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most commentator on this question is Professor Moore who urges
that the reference to "defendant" is only to plaintiff's defendant
and "does not include such defendants as third-party defendants.) . 8 .8 This view, if generally accepted, would of course make
unnecessary any discussion of the other two considerations, viz.,
(1) what is a separate and independent cause of action, and
(2) can it be joined only by the original plaintiff? Since the
courts do not generally deal with this contention, a discussion of
the second problem of what constitutes a separate and independent
cause of action is of greater significance.
The Supreme Court in Finn seems to have conclusively settled
the question of what is "separate and independent." In that case,
a Texas resident brought suit against two foreign insurance
companies and a Texas agent of the companies for breach of an
insurance contract. One of the non-resident insurance companies
had the court remove the suit into a federal court but the Supreme
Court did not permit such removal, holding that "where there is
a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising
from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate
and independent claim or cause of action under section 1441 (c)." 19
The federal courts have consistently adhered to this construction
of the phrase.20  There are some commentators who argue that
such an interpretation renders the phrase rather meaningless by
contending that a basis for removability will rarely exist because
most state procedural statutes and rules2 ' on joinder of parties
permit such joinder only upon a showing of a common question of
law or fact arising out of the same transaction. 22  Consequently,
they noint out, if such claims must involve common questions
18 See 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcT'Icz 0.157[7], at 264 n.8 (2d ed.
1961).
19 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, supra note 9, at 14; Gray v. New
Mexico Military Institute, 249 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1957); see 1 BARRON
& HOLTZoFF, op. cit. supra note 15, § 105; Note, Removal Under Section
1441(c) of the Judicial Code, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 101, 106-07 (1952).
20 Durham v. Irish Shipping, Ltd., 204 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
Anderson v. Union Pac. R.R., 200 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1962); Marshall
v. Navco Co., 152 F. Supp. 50 (S.D. Tex. 1957). A recent decision -went
so far as to declare that if twelve insurance companies insure plaintiff
against the same risk even though for varying amounts, this would not
constitute a separate and independent cause of action under § 1441(c) because
the claim against each was based on the same loss. Lancer Indus. Inc. v.
American Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 894, 900 (W.D. La. 1961).
In another interesting fact situation, a court stated that the fact that
some of plaintiff's claims are in tort and some in contract does not serve
automatically to make them separate and independent. It requires a separate
and independent claim, not merely a separate and independent theory. Knight
v. Chrysler Corp., 134 F. Supp. 598, 601 (D.N.J. 1955).
21 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 212; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2:27-34,
2:27-38 (1939).
22 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 15. § 105, at 494.
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arising from the same transaction they will seldom comply with
the Supreme Court's interpretative norm of "separate and in-
dependent cause of action."
The third problem which has, by far, resulted in the greatest
disagreement among those courts which have considered it, is
whether the phrase "is joined with" in section 1441(c) refers
exclusively to claims joined by the original plaintiff or does it also
contemplate "claims introduced by a defendant through third-party
practice." 23 It is this precise question which is closely considered
in the principal case. There are two lines of cases, one permitting
removal even though there be no joinder by the original plaintiff
and one denying removal, claiming that the statute has no reference
at all to joinder by other than such a plaintiff.
A New York district court in construing section 1441, shortly
after its enactment, in President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v.
Monogram Associates Inc. 24 avoided any discussion of limiting
joinder to the original plaintiff and the result was removal by the
third-party defendant.25 Five years later, a New Jersey district
court in Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn 26 likewise per-
mitted removal by such a defendant and similarly ignored the
problem of the construction of the phrase "is joined with." In at
least one case previous to the principal case, the Southern District
of New York had assumed sub silentio the right of removal by a
third-party defendant.27
The contrary judicial approach is best represented by two
Arkansas district court opinions written by Chief Tudee Miller.28
In Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson,29 the Arkansas
court adopted Professor Moore's view that the joinder "may
properly be confined to a joinder of claims by the nlaintiff ... " 30
The court indicated that it believed Congress did not intend to
extend the right to claims not joined by the original plaint;ff
23 Burlingham v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
2481 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).25 Ibid. The court permitted removal on the ground of diversity and
the existence of a controversy completely separate and distinct from that
stated in the pleadings between plaintiff and defendant. Ibid.
26 119 F. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1954). This court argued that § 1441 should
be uniformly applied. If New Jersey practice had not permitted third-partyjoinder, the third-party defendant would have been brought into another
court as an ordinary defendant and would have had an unquestionable right
of removal based on diversity of citizenship.
27 See Chemical Corn Exch. Bank v. Hause, 159 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
28 Shaver y. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D.
Ark. 1959); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680
(W.D. Ark. 1951).
29101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
3o Id. at 682.
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and that had Congress so intended, it would have used language
clearly evidencing its intent to extend the jurisdiction of federal
courts.3 ' The court in Sequoyah expressly refused to follow the
New York approach set down in Monogram Associates. In 1959,
this same court in Shaver v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys. Inc.3 2
again referred to the Monogram decision and labelled it erroneous. 33
It refused to permit removal because the third-party defendant was
not joined as a party by the original plaintiff but by the t.fird-
party plaintiff.3 4
The principal case is the first in which a New York district
court has passed on the joinder problem. The Court squarely
faced the issue by stating "the problem arises from the words
'is joined with. . .. 1' 35 The Court, after considering both classes
of cases aforementioned, stated that "the more persuasive reasoning
lies with those denying the power of a third party to remove" 36
because it is only ancillary to the main action. In adopting this
position the Court is echoing the position long taken by Professor
Moore, who believes that third-party suits are "too ancillary to
the main action to be classified as separate and independent
claims." 37 A third-party claim should not, said the Court, be able
to confer federal jurisdiction upon the main suit where the main
suit is not otherwise within federal jurisdiction,3" and to allow
such removal "is an unwarranted extension of the federal judicial
power." 39 The Court concluded that removal must be limited
31 Ibid.
32 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
33 The Arkansas court pointed out that the New York court did not
discuss the problem of joinder of claims.
A Recent Decision appearing in 51 MICH. L. REv. 115 (1952) considers
the Sequoyah and Monogram Associates cases and concludes that the
Sequoyah interpretation of § 1441 is the correct one. The author based his
conclusion mainly on Congress' avowed policy of limiting removal jurisdiction.
Id. at 117.
34 Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., supra note 28, at 763.3 5Burlingham v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 208 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
38 Ibi.
37 IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fr 0.167110], at 1052 (2d ed. 1961).
Professor Moore argues that if the original defendants have no right to
remove plaintiff's suit or if the original defendants have chosen not to
exercise such a right, no reason exists why an ancillary defendant to an
ancillary claim should, absent express granting of such a right by Congress,
have the power to remove and consequently to defeat the main litigants'
choice of the state forum. Ibid.
38 In reality this is not, as the Court states, akin to "the tail wagging
the dog" because under 28 U.S.C. §1441(c), "the district court . . . may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction." See
Breslerman v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 169 F. Supp. 531, 533 (E.D.N.Y.
1959).
9 Burlingham v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., supra note 35, at 547.
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to the original plaintiff's defendant and thus can only affect those
claims joined by the original plaintiff. The right of removal is a
purely statutory right and in light of the avowed congressional
purpose to limit removal, the statute must be strictly construed.40
The Court in the principal case is the first federal district
court in New York to consider the interpretation of the phrase
"joined by" in section 1441. This holding is indeed significant
in that it is the only New York district court to expressly deny
the right of removal by a third-party defendant based on a
strict construction of section 1441(c). Such a treatment of
"ancillary" third-party claims is consistent with the present federal
trend.4
It is interesting to note that the liability of the third-party
defendant was contingent upon the original defendant's liability
to fhe plaintiff. Both causes of action arose from the identical
transaction, and, under the rule of the Finn case, such circum-
stances do not result in "separate and independent" actions. Since
the Court in the principal case could have conveniently denied re-
moval on this basis, it could be said that the Court desired to
determine the applicability of section 1441 to third-party practice.
Such a broad holding now makes a determination of what con-
stitutes "separate and independent" unnecessary since removal is
precluded ab initio.
JUDGMENTS - REs JuDIcATA HELD INOPERATIVE IN INTER-
STATE LAND CONTROVERSY. - A change in the flow of the Missouri
River - the borderline between Missouri and Nebraska - caused
the jurisdictional location of certain river bottom land to become
40 Ibid.
41 Approximately one month after the principal case was decided, a New
Jersey district court in White v. Baftic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716
(D.N.J. 1962) rendered a decision denying the third-party defendant's right
to remove. The basic reasoning employed by the court in Baltic is
substantially that used in the principal case, but the court in Baltic offers
additional arguments by suggesting that if the ancillary suit were removed
and the transactions were interrelated, one court might have to await the
outcome of the other's trial and this would defeat "the prompt; economical,
and sound administration of justice." Id. at 721. A second argument
offered is that if one court controls a main claim and a third-party claim,
it will be considerably easier to promote settlement possibilities. Ibid.
The court here expressly refused to follow the decision in Industrial
Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F.. Supp. 284 (D.N.J. 1954), which
was rendered by a federal court of the same jurisdiction and whose holding
was contra.
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